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ABSTRACT
We give a new link spam detection and PageRank demotion
algorithm called MaxRank. Like TrustRank and AntiTrust-
Rank, it starts with a seed of hand-picked trusted and spam
pages. We define the MaxRank of a page as the frequency
of visit of this page by a random surfer minimizing an av-
erage cost per time unit. On a given page, the random
surfer selects a set of hyperlinks and clicks with uniform
probability on any of these hyperlinks. The cost function
penalizes spam pages and hyperlink removals. The goal is
to determine a hyperlink deletion policy that minimizes this
score. The MaxRank is interpreted as a modified PageRank
vector, used to sort web pages instead of the usual Page-
Rank vector. The bias vector of this ergodic control prob-
lem, which is unique up to an additive constant, is a mea-
sure of the “spamicity” of each page, used to detect spam
pages. We give a scalable algorithm for MaxRank computa-
tion that allowed us to perform experimental results on the
WEBSPAM-UK2007 dataset. We show that our algorithm
outperforms both TrustRank and AntiTrustRank for spam
and nonspam page detection.
1. INTRODUCTION
Internet search engines use a variety of algorithms to sort
web pages based on their text content or on the hyperlink
structure of the web. In this paper, we focus on algorithms
that use the latter hyperlink structure, called link-based al-
gorithms. The basic notion for all these algorithms is the
web graph, which is a digraph with a node for each web page
and an arc between pages i and j if there is a hyperlink from
page i to page j.
One of the main link-based ranking methods is the Page-
Rank introduced by Brin and Page [10]. It is defined as
the invariant measure of a walk made by a random surfer
on the web graph. When reading a given page, the surfer
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Labs through the research contract CRE 3795 with INRIA.
either selects a link from the current page (with a uniform
probability), and moves to the page pointed by that link,
or interrupts his current search, and then moves to an ar-
bitrary page, which is selected according to given “telepor-
tation” probabilities. The rank of a page is defined as its
frequency of visit by the random surfer. It is interpreted as
the “popularity” of the page.
From the early days of search engines, some webmasters have
tried to get their web pages overranked thanks to malicious
manipulations. For instance, adding many keywords on a
page is a classical way to make search engines consider a page
relevant to many queries. With the advent of link-based
algorithms, spammers have developed new strategies, called
link-spamming [19], that intend to give some target page
a high score. For instance, Gyo¨ngyi and Garcia-Molina [18]
showed various linking strategies that improve the PageRank
score of a page. They justified the presence of link farms
with patterns with every page linking to one single page.
Baeza-Yates, Castillo and Lo´pez [5] also showed that making
collusions is a good way to improve PageRank.
In order to fight such malicious manipulations that deteri-
orate search engines’ results and deceive web surfers, var-
ious techniques have been developed. We refer to [11] for
a detailed survey of this subject. Each spam detection al-
gorithm is focused on a particular aspect of spam pages.
Content analysis (see [25] for instance) is the main tool to
detect deceiving keywords. Some simple heuristics [2] may
be enough to detect the most coarse link-spam techniques,
but more evolved graph algorithms like clique detection [27],
SpamRank [8] or Truncated PageRank [7] have also been
developed to fight link-spamming. As web spammers adapt
themselves to detection algorithms, machine learning tech-
niques [16] try to discover actual predominant spam strate-
gies and to adapt to its evolutions. Another direction of
research concerns the propagation of trust through the web
graph with the TrustRank algorithm [20] and its variants or
the propagation of distrust through a reversed web graph
with the AntiTrustRank algorithm [22].
In this paper, we develop a new link spam detection and
PageRank demotion algorithm called MaxRank. Like in [20,
22], we start with a seed of hand-picked trusted and spam
pages. We define the MaxRank of a page as the frequency
of visit of this page by a random surfer minimizing an aver-
age cost per time unit. On a given page, the random surfer
selects a set of hyperlinks and clicks with uniform probabil-
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ity on any of these hyperlinks. The cost function penalizes
spam pages and hyperlink removals. The goal is to deter-
mine an optimal hyperlink deletion policy. The features of
MaxRank are based on PageRank optimization [3, 24, 14,
21, 13] and more particularly on the results of [15]. Those
papers have shown that the problem of optimizing the Page-
Rank of a set of pages by controlling some hyperlinks can
be solved by Markov Decision process algorithms. In these
works, the optimization of PageRank was thought from a
webmaster’s point of view whereas here, we take the search
engine’s point of view. We show that the Markov Decision
Process defining MaxRank is solvable in polynomial time
(Proposition 2), because the polytopes of occupation mea-
sures admit efficient (polynomial time) separation oracles.
The invariant measure of the Markov Decision Process, the
MaxRank vector, is interpreted as a modified PageRank vec-
tor, used to sort web pages instead of the usual PageRank
vector. The solution of the ergodic dynamic programming
equation, called the bias vector, is unique up to an additive
constant and is interpreted as a measure of the “spamicity”
of each page, used to detect spam pages.
We give a scalable algorithm for MaxRank computation
that allowed us to perform numerical experiments on the
WEBSPAM-UK2007 dataset [1]. We show that our algo-
rithm outperforms both TrustRank and AntiTrustRank for
spam and nonspam page detection. As an example, on the
WEBSPAM-UK2007 dataset, for a recall of 0.8 in the spam
detection problem, MaxRank has a precision of 0.87 while
TrustRank has a precision of 0.30 and AntiTrustRank a pre-
cision of 0.13.
2. THE PAGERANK AND (ANTI)-
TRUSTRANK ALGORITHMS
We first recall the basic elements of the Google PageRank
computation, see [10] and [23] for more information. We call
web graph the directed graph with a node per web page and
an arc from page i to page j if page i contains a hyperlink
to page j. We identify the set of pages to [n] := {1, . . . , n}.
Let Di denote the number of hyperlinks contained in page i.
Assume first that Di ≥ 1 for all i ∈ [n], meaning that every
page has at least one outlink. Then, we construct the n× n
stochastic matrix S, which is such that
Si,j =
{
D−1i if page j is pointed to from page i
0 otherwise
(1)
We also fix a row vector z ∈ Rn+, the zapping or teleportation
vector, which must be stochastic (so,
∑
j∈[n] zj = 1), to-
gether with a damping factor α ∈ [0, 1] (typically α = 0.85)
and define the new stochastic matrix
P = αS + (1− α)ez
where e is the (column) vector in Rn with all entries equal
to 1.
When some page i has no outlink, Di = 0, and so the entries
of the ith row of the matrix S cannot be defined according
to (1). Then, we set Si,j := zj .
Consider now a Markov chain (Xt)t≥0 with transition ma-
trix P , so that for all i, j ∈ [n], P(Xt+1 = j|Xt = i) = Pi,j .
Then, Xt represents the position of a websurfer at time t:
when at page i, the websurfer continues his current explo-
ration of the web with probability α and moves to the next
page by following the links included in page i, as above, or
with probability 1 − α, stops his current exploration and
then teleports to page j with probability zj .
The PageRank pi is defined as the invariant measure of the
Markov chain (Xt)t≥0 representing the behavior of the web-
surfer. This invariant measure is unique if α < 1 or if P is
irreducible.
The TrustRank algorithm [20] is a semi-automatic algorithm
designed for spam detection and PageRank demotion. It
starts with a seed of hand-picked trusted pages and then
launches the PageRank algorithm with a teleportation vec-
tor with nonzero entries only on this seed of trusted pages.
Thus the initial trust score of trusted pages will propagate
through hyperlinks. The fundamental idea is that trusted
pages link to trusted pages and spam pages are linked to
by spam pages [12]. Each coordinate of the vector obtained
this way gives the TrustRank score of the associated page.
Pages with a high TrustRank score are trusted and consid-
ered to be non spam, pages with a small Trustrank score are
untrusted and considered to be spam. The boundary be-
tween trusted and untrusted pages is an arbitrary threshold
in TrustRank. As it is a variant of PageRank, the TrustRank
score can also be used as such to rank pages instead of the
usual PageRank. This is called PageRank demotion, where
untrusted pages get a negative promotion of their score.
The AntiTrustRank algorithm [22] follows the same idea as
TrustRank but it uses a seed of spam pages instead of a
seed of trusted pages and launches the PageRank algorithm
using reversed arcs, i.e., it considers a reversed web graph
where there is an arc between nodes i and j if page j points
to page i. Pages with a high AntiTrustRank are then con-
sidered to be spam pages.
3. WELL-DESCRIBEDMARKOVDECISION
PROCESSES
The definition of the MaxRank relies on the notion of Markov
Decision Processes that we recall now.
A finite Markov decision process is a 4-uple (I, (Ai)i∈I , p, c)
where I is a finite set called the state space; for all i ∈ I,
Ai is the finite set of admissible actions in state i; p : I ×
∪i∈I({i} × Ai) → R+ is the transition law, so that p(j|i, a)
is the probability to go to state j form state i when action
a ∈ Ai is selected; and c : ∪i∈I({i} × Ai) → R is the cost
function, so that c(i, a) is the instantaneous cost when action
a is selected in state i.
Let Xt ∈ I denote the state of the system at the discrete
time t ≥ 0. A deterministic control strategy ν is a sequence of
actions (νt)t≥0 such that for all t ≥ 0, νt is a function of the
history ht = (X0, ν0, . . . , Xt−1, νt−1, Xt) and νt ∈ AXt . Of
course, P(Xt+1 = j|Xt, νt) = p(j|Xt, νt),∀j ∈ [n], ∀t ≥ 0.
More generally, we may consider randomized strategies ν
where νt is a probability measure on AXt . A strategy ν is
stationary (feedback) if there exists a function ν¯ such that
for all t ≥ 0, νt(ht) = ν¯(Xt).
Given an initial distribution µ representing the law of X0,
the average cost infinite horizon Markov decision problem,
also called ergodic control problem, consists in maximizing
lim inf
T→+∞
1
T
E(
T−1∑
t=0
c(Xt, νt)) (2)
where the maximum is taken over the set of randomized con-
trol strategies ν. Indeed, the supremum is the same if it is
taken only over the set of randomized (or even determinis-
tic) stationary feedback strategies (Theorem 9.1.8 in [26] for
instance).
A Markov decision process is unichain if the transition ma-
trix corresponding to every stationary policy has a single
recurrent class. Otherwise it is multichain. When the prob-
lem is unichain, its value does not depend on the initial
distribution whereas when it is not, one may consider a vec-
tor (gi)i∈I where gi represents the value of the problem (2)
when starting from state i, meaning that the law of X0 is
the Dirac measure at point i.
We shall need an extension of the formalism of Markov Deci-
sion processes in which the actions are implicitly described.
This extension, developped in [15], relies on the theory of
Groetschel, Lova´sz and Schrijver [17] of linear programming
over polyhedra given by separation oracles.
Definition 1 (Def. 6.2.2 of [17]). We say that a po-
lyhedron B has facet-complexity at most φ if there exists
a system of inequalities with rational coefficients that has
solution set B and such that the encoding length of each in-
equality of the system (the sum of the number of bits of the
rational numbers appearing as coefficients in this inequality)
is at most φ.
A well-described polyhedron is a triple (B;n, φ) where B ⊆
Rn is a polyhedron with facet-complexity at most φ. The
encoding length of B is by definition n+ φ.
Definition 2 (Prob. (2.1.4) of [17]). A strong sep-
aration oracle for a set K is an algorithm that solves the
following problem: given a vector y, decide whether y ∈ K
or not and if not, find a hyperplane that separates y from K;
i.e., find a vector u such that uT y > max{uTx, x ∈ K}.
Inspired by Definition 1, we introduced the following notion.
Definition 3 ([15]). A finite Markov decision process
(I, (Ai)i∈I , p, c) is well-described if for every state i ∈ I, we
have Ai ⊂ RLi for some Li ∈ N, if there exists φ ∈ N such
that the convex hull of every action set Ai is a well-described
polyhedron (Bi;Li, φ) with a polynomial time strong sepa-
ration oracle, and if the costs and transition probabilities
satisfy c(i, a) =
∑
l∈[Li] alC
l
i and p(j|i, a) =
∑
l∈[Li] alQ
l
i,j,
∀i, j ∈ I, ∀a ∈ Ai, where Cli and Qli,j are given rational
numbers, for i, j ∈ I and l ∈ [Li].
The encoding length of a well-described Markov decision
process is by definition the sum of the encoding lengths of
the rational numbers Qli,j and C
l
i and of the well-described
polyhedra Bi.
The interest of well described Markov decision processes is
that, even if they have a number of actions exponential in
the size of the problem, Theorem 3 in [15] shows that the
average cost infinite horizon problem for a well-described
(multichain) Markov decision process can be solved in a time
polynomial in the input length.
4. THE MAXRANK ALGORITHM
In this section, we define the MaxRank algorithm. It is based
on our earlier works on PageRank optimization [15]. In [15],
we considered the problem of optimizing the PageRank of a
given website from a webmaster’s point of view, that is with
some controlled hyperlinks and design constraints. Here,
we take the search engine’s point of view. Hence, for every
hyperlink of the web, we can choose to take it into account
or not: our goal is to forget spam links while letting trusted
links active in the determination of the ranking.
As in TrustRank [20] and AntiTrustRank [22], we start with
a seed of trusted pages and known spam pages. The basic
idea is to minimize the sum of PageRank scores of spam
pages and maximize the sum of PageRank scores of non-
spam pages, by allowing us to remove some hyperlinks when
computing the PageRank. However, if we do so, the opti-
mal strategy simply consists in isolating spam pages from
trusted pages: there is then no hope to detect other spam
and nonspam pages. Thus, we add a penalty when a hy-
perlink is removed, so that “spamicity” can still propagate
through (removed or not removed) hyperlinks. Finally, we
also control the teleportation vector in order to penalize fur-
ther pages that we suspect to be spam pages.
We model this by a controlled random walk on the web
graph, in which the hyperlinks can be removed. Each time
the random surfer goes to a spam page, he gets a positive
cost, each time he goes to a trusted page, he gets a nega-
tive cost. When the status of the page is unknown, no cost
incurs. In addition to this a priori cost, he gets a penalty
for each hyperlink removed. Like for PageRank, the random
surfer teleports with probability α at every time step; how-
ever, in this framework, he chooses the set of pages to which
he wants to teleport.
Let Fx be the set of pages pointed by x in the original graph
and Dx be the degree of x. An action consists in determining
J ⊆ Fx, the set of hyperlinks that remain, and I ⊆ [n], the
set of pages to which the surfer may teleport. We shall
restrict I to have a cardinality equal to N ≤ n. Then, the
probability of transition from page x to page y is
p(y|x, I, J) = ανy(I, J) + (1− α)zy(I)
where the teleportation vector and the hyperlink click prob-
ability distribution are given by
zy(I) =
{
|I|−1 if y ∈ I
0 otherwise
νy(I, J) =

zy(I) if |J | = ∅
|J |−1 if y ∈ J
0 otherwise
The cost at page x is given by
c(x, I, J) = c′x + γ
Dx − |J |
Dx
.
c′x is the a priori cost of page x. This a priori cost should
be positive for known spam pages and negative for trusted
pages. Dx is the degree of x in the web graph and γ > 0
is a penalty factor. The penalty γDx−|J|
Dx
is proportional to
the number of pages removed.
We study the following ergodic control problem:
inf
(It)t≥0,(Jt)t≥0
lim sup
T→+∞
1
T
E(
T−1∑
t=0
c(Xt, It, Jt)) , (3)
where an admissible control consists in selecting, at each
time step t, a subset of pages It ⊆ [n] with |It| = N to
which teleportation is permitted, and a subset Jt ⊆ FXt of
the set of hyperlinks in the currently visited page Xt.
The following proposition gives an alternative formulation
of Problem (3) that we will then show to be well-described.
Proposition 1. Fix N ∈ N and let
Z = {z ∈ Rn|
∑
i∈[n]
zi = 1, 0 ≤ zi ≤ 1
N
} .
Let Fx be the set of pages pointed by x in the original graph
and Dx be the degree of x. Let Px be the polyhedron defined
as the set of vectors (σ, ν) ∈ RDx+1 × Rn such that there
exists w ∈ R(Dx+1)×n verifying
Dx∑
d=0
σd = 1 (4a)
σd ≥ 0 , ∀d ∈ {0, . . . , Dx} (4b)
νj =
Dx∑
d=0
wdj , ∀j ∈ [n] (4c)∑
j∈[n]
wdj = σ
d , ∀d ∈ {0, . . . , Dx} (4d)
0 ≤ w0j ≤ σ
0
Nz
, ∀j ∈ [n] (4e)
wdj = 0 , ∀j 6∈ Fx,∀d ∈ {1, . . . , Dx} (4f)
0 ≤ wdj ≤ σ
d
d
, ∀j ∈ Fx,∀d ∈ {1, . . . , Dx} (4g)
Then Problem 3 is equivalent to the following ergodic control
problem
inf
σ,ν,z
lim sup
T→+∞
1
T
E(
T−1∑
t=0
c˜(Xt, σt, νt, zt)) , (5)
where the cost is defined as
c˜(x, σ, ν, z) = c′x + γ
Dx −∑Dxd=0 dσd
Dx
and the transitions are
p˜(y|x, σ, ν, z) = ανy + (1− α)zy .
The admissible controls verify for all t, (σt, νt) ∈ extr(PXt)
(the set of extreme point of the polytope) and zt ∈ extr(Z).
Indeed, to each action (σ, ν, z) of Problem (5) corresponds a
unique action I, J of Problem (3) and vice versa. Moreover,
the respective transitions and costs are equal.
Proof. Fix a page x in [n]. The extreme points of Z are
the vectors of Rn with N coordinates equal to 1
N
and the
other ones equal to 0. Hence z(I) ∈ extr(Z) and for each
extreme point z′ of Z there exists I ∈ [n] such that |I| = N
and z′ = z(I). We shall also describe the set of extreme
points of Px.
From the theory of disjunctive linear programming [6], we
can see that the polytope K = {ν | (σ, ν) ∈ Px} is the convex
hull of the union of Dx + 1 polytopes that we will denote
Kd, d ∈ {0, 1 . . . Dx}. If d = 0, then K0 = Z. If d > 0,
Kd = {ν ∈ Rn |
∑
j∈[n] νj = 1, 0 ≤ νj ≤ 1d , ∀j ∈ Fx, νj =
0,∀j 6∈ Fx}.
Let (σ, ν) be an extreme point of Px. By Corollary 2.1.2-ii)
in [6], there exists d∗ such that σd
∗
= 1 and ν is an extreme
point of K. As σd∗ = 1 and σd = 0 for d 6= d∗, we conclude
that ν is also an extreme point of Kd∗ = Px ∩ {σ|σd∗ = 1}.
If d∗ = 0, ν ∈ extr(Z) and if d∗ > 0, the extreme points of
Kd∗ correspond exactly to the vectors with d
∗ coordinates
in Fx equal to 1d∗ and the other ones equal to 0. Hence there
exists I ⊆ [n] and J ⊆ Fx such that |I| = N , |J | = d∗ and
ν = ν(I, J).
Conversely, fix I and J and let σ(J) be such that σd(J) = 1
if and only if d = |J |. Then (σ(J), ν(I, J)) is an extreme
point of Px by Corollary 2.1.2-i) in [6].
Finally the costs are the same since |J | = ∑Dxd=0 dσd.
Proposition 2. If α, γ and c′i, i ∈ [n] are rational num-
bers, then the ergodic control problem (5) is the average cost
infinite horizon problem for a well described Markov decision
process and it is polynomial time solvable.
Proof. Clearly, the process described is a Markov deci-
sion process. As the polytopes Pi, i ∈ [n] and Z are de-
scribed by a polynomial number of inequalities with at most
n + 1 terms in each, they are well described. Indeed, the
separation oracle consisting simply in testing each inequal-
ity terminates in polynomial time. The cost and transitions
are linear functions on those polytopes with rational coeffi-
cients since α and c′i, i ∈ [n] are rational numbers. Thus the
Markov decision process is well described. By Theorem 3
in [15], Problem (5) is thus solvable in polynomial time.
Proposition 3. The dynamic programming equation
vi + λ = min
(σ,ν)∈Pi,z∈Z
c′i + γ
Di −∑Did=0 dσd
Di
+
∑
j∈[n]
(ανj + (1− α)zj)vj , ∀i ∈ [n] (6)
has a solution v ∈ Rn and λ ∈ R. The constant λ is unique
and is the value of problem (3). An optimal strategy is ob-
tained by selecting for each state i, (σ, ν) ∈ Pi and z ∈ Z
maximizing Equation (6). The function v is called the bias.
Proof. Theorem 8.4.3 in [Put94] applied to the unichain
ergodic control problem (5) implies the result of the proposi-
tion but with Pi replaced by extr(Pi). But as the expression
which is maximized is affine, using Pi or extr(Pi) yields the
same solution. Proposition 1 gives the equivalence between
(3) and (5)
Proposition 4. Let T be the dynamic programming op-
erator Rn → Rn defined by
Ti(v) = min
(σ,ν)∈Pi
c′i+γ
Di −∑Did=0 dσd
Di
+α
∑
j∈[n]
νjvj , ∀i ∈ [n].
The map T is α-contracting in the sup norm and its fixed
point v, which is unique, is such that (v, (1−α) minz∈Z z ·v)
is solution of the ergodic dynamic programming equation (6).
Proof. The set {ν st: (σ, ν) ∈ Pi} is a set of probability
measures so λ ∈ R ⇒ T (v + λ) = T (v) + αλ and v ≥ w ⇒
T (v) ≥ T (w). This implies that T is α-contracting. Let v
be its fixed point. For all i ∈ [n],
vi + (1− α) min
z∈Z
z · v
= min
(σ,ν)∈Pi,z∈Z
c′i+γ
Di −∑Did=0 dσd
Di
+
∑
j∈[n]
ανjvj+(1−α)zjvj
We get equation (6) with constant (1− α) minz∈Z z · v.
We can then solve the dynamic programming equation (6)
and so the ergodic control problem (3) by value iteration
(outer loop of Algorithm 1).
The algorithm starts with an initial potential function v,
scans repeatedly the pages and updates vi when i is the
current page according to vi ← Ti(v) until convergence is
reached. Then (v, (1 − α) minz∈Z zv) is solution of the er-
godic dynamic programming equation (6) and an optimal
linkage strategy is recovered by selecting the maximizing
(σ, ν) at each page. An optimal teleportation vector is re-
covered by selecting a maximizing z in minz∈Z zv.
Thanks to the damping factor α, the iteration can be seen
to be α-contracting if the pages are scanned in a cyclic or-
der. Thus the algorithm converges in a number of steps
independent of the dimension of the web graph.
For the evaluation of the dynamic programming operator
T at a page i (inner for-loop of Algorithm 1), we remark
that for a fixed 0 − 1 valued σ, that is for a fixed number
of removed hyperlinks, the operator Ti maximizes a linear
function on a hypercube, which reduces essentially to a sort.
Any extreme point (σ, ν) of Pi necessarily verifies that σ is
0− 1 valued. Thus we just need to choose the best value of
σ among the Di + 1 possibilities.
Algorithm 1 MaxRank algorithm
1: Initialization: v ∈ Rn
2: while ‖v − T (v)‖∞ ≥  do
3: Sort (vl)l∈[n] in increasing order and let φ : [n] → [n]
be the sort function so that vφ(1) ≤ · · · ≤ vφ(n).
4: λ← 1−α
N
∑N
j=1 vφ(j)
5: for i from 1 to n do
6: w0i ← c′i + γ + α1−αλ
7: Sort (vj)j∈Fi in increasing order and let ψ : Fi →
{1, . . . , |Fi|} such that vψ(1) ≤ · · · ≤ vψ(|Fi|).
8: for d from 1 to Di do
9: wdi ← c′i + γDi−dDi +
α
d
∑d
j=1 vψ(j)
10: end for
11: vi ← Ti(v) = mind∈{0,1,...,Di} wdi
12: end for
13: end while
This very efficient algorithm is highly scalable: we used it for
our experimental results on a large size dataset (Section 5).
The following proposition shows that if γ is too big, then
the optimal link removal strategy is trivial. It also gives an
interpretation of the bias vector in terms of number of visits
of spam pages.
Proposition 5. If γ > 2α
1−α‖c‖∞, then no link should
be removed. Moreover if in addition, c′i = 1 when i is a
spam page and 0 otherwise, then the ith coordinate of the fix
point of operator T in Proposition 4 is equal to the expected
mean number of spam pages visited before teleportation when
starting a walk from page i.
Proof. Proposition 4 gives a normalization of the bias
vector such that it cannot take any value bigger than ‖c‖∞
1−α ,
as it is the case for PageRank optimization [14, 15].
Now fix i ∈ [n]. Let ν0 = ν(Fi) and ν = ν(I, J) for J ⊂ Fi.
If J = ∅, then
α
∣∣νv − ν0v∣∣ ≤ α |νv|+ α ∣∣ν0v∣∣ ≤ 2α
1− α‖c‖∞
Di − |∅|
Di
.
If J 6= ∅, then
α
∣∣νv − ν0v∣∣ ≤ α ∣∣∣∣∣( 1|J | − 1Di )∑
j∈J
vj
∣∣∣∣∣+ α
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Di
∑
j∈Fi
vj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ Di − |J ||J |Di
α‖c‖∞
1− α +
Di − |J |
Di
α‖c‖∞
1− α ≤ γ
Di − |J |
Di
.
This proves that choosing J = Fi is always the best strategy
when γ > 2α
1−α‖c‖∞.
When no link is removed and c′ is defined as in the proposi-
tion, we are in the framework of [14], where it is shown that
the ith coordinate of the fix points of the operator T is equal
to the expected mean number of visits before teleportation
when starting a walk from page i.
5. SPAM DETECTION AND PAGERANK
DEMOTION
We performed numerical experiments on the WEBSPAM-
UK2007 dataset [1]. This is a crawl of the .uk websites with
n = 105,896,555 pages performed in 2007, associated with
lists of hosts classified as spam, nonspam and borderline.
There is a training dataset for the setting of the algorithm
and a test dataset to test the performance of the algorithm.
We took γ = 4, α = 0.85, N = 0.89n, c′i = 1 if i is a spam
page of the training dataset, c′i = −0.2 if i is a nonspam
page of the training dataset and c′i = 0 otherwise. Then we
obtained a MaxRank score and the associated bias vector.
We also computed TrustRank and AntiTrustRank with the
training dataset as the seed sets. We used the Webgraph
framework [9], so that we could manage the computation on
a personal computer with four Intel Xeon CPUs at 2.98 Ghz
and 8 GB RAM. We coded the algorithm in a parallel fashion
thanks to the OpenMP library. Computation took around
6 minutes for each evaluation of the dynamic programming
operator of Proposition 4 and 6 hours for 60 such iterations
(precision on the objective α60 ≤ 6.10−5). By comparison,
PageRank computation with the same precision required 1.3
hour on the same computer, which is of the same order of
magnitude.
Figure 1 gives the values taken by the bias vector. Figure 2
compares the precision and recall of PageRank, TrustRank,
AntiTrustRank and MaxRank bias for spam or non spam
detection. Precision and recall are the usual measures of
the quality of an information retrieval algorithm [4]. Pre-
cision is the probability that a randomly selected retrieved
document is relevant. Recall is the probability that a ran-
domly selected relevant document is retrieved in a search.
These values were obtained using the training and the test
sets. Figure 3 compares TrustRank and MaxRank scores for
PageRank demotion.
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